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1 Introduction
Tackling the issues raised by evaluatives and pejoratives means to adopt an in-
terdisciplinary perspective, where the issues in Linguistics turn out to be crucial
for philosophical purposes. The first question to ask is the following: What is to
be evaluative? Is it more robust than just being used evaluatively?
Väyrynen sets aside two broad notions of evaluativeness:
a) A comparison of any kind. All gradable adjectives would be evaluative in
this sense, even terms like ‘tall’.
b) Among gradable adjectives, predicates of personal taste whose interpreta-
tion seems to depend on a judge.
Thenotion of evaluativeness inwhichphilosophers are interested ismore re-
stricted than (a) and (b). Thereare standards, but theyarenot experiencer/judge-
dependent. Still, even with these restrictions, the class of candidate evaluative
terms looks pretty heterogeneous, including at least:
- “Thin” evaluative terms (“good”/ “bad”; “right”/“wrong”, maybe even “ra-
tional”). Semantically, there isbasicallyno restrictiononwhat canbecalled
“bad”, for instance; it depends on something that is extralinguistics.
- “Thick” evaluative terms (“cruel”, “courageous”, “selfish”, “smart”, “tactful”,
“graceful”). Compared to thin terms, they have more descriptive informa-
tion built in: not any kind of “bad” can be “cruel”.
- “Affective” terms (“desirable”, “admirable”, “contemptible”, “loathsome”,
“harrowing”).
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- “Pejorative” terms (racial and ethnic slurs, but also expressions like “jerk”,
“bimbo”, “asshole”).
The two main claims of Väyrynen are the following: (i) An old claim, that is
that thick terms and pejoratives are sufficiently dissimilar linguistically that giv-
ing different treatments of their relationship to evaluation isn’t a mark against a
theory; and (ii) a more recent claim, that in fact a pragmatic treatment of evalu-
atives and pejoratives (and of the evaluative uses of some affective terms)might
be defensible. Maybe not true at the end, but at last defensible.
2 Thick Terms and Pejoratives
Youmight think that it is not so strange to find that Thick Terms and Pejoratives
(especially slurs) are analyzed differently if they behave differently. Well, the
thing is, slurs and pejoratives do have something in common. The use of each
in some way involves both non-evaluative description and evaluation.
Hare, (1963), Blackburn, (1992), Gibbard, (1992) and Richard, (2008) suggest
that slurs and objectionable thick terms are similar in their relation to evalua-
tion. And indeed, there are similarities of course at least between slurs and ob-
jectionable thick terms; moreover, if we assume that in principle any thick term
is open to be considered objectionable, then that is a further argument to sup-
port theparallel betweenslurs an thick terms ingeneral. If you lookat thediscus-
sion on slurs it is very common to locate the derogation that they carry in their
semantic – broadlymeant –, so truth-conditions (Hom, 2008), conventional im-
plicatures (Whiting, 2013), and semantic rules of use (Jeshion, 2013). And indeed
if you look at the discussion on thick terms, it is very common as well to locate
evaluation at the semantic level, even at the truth-conditional (Kyle, 2013).
2.1 Linguistic Similarities
Themost striking similarity between pejoratives and thick terms is that the eval-
uative content seems to project out from embedding at least under negation,
questions, possibly modals and conditionals. Consider:
(1) Speaker A: Hans is a kraut.
Speaker B: No he isn’t.
(2) a. Hans is not a kraut.
b. Is Hans a kraut?
c. Hans might be a kraut (Or: Maybe Hans is a kraut).
d. If Hans is a kraut, we shouldn’t gossip in German.
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e. If I were racist, I probably wouldn’t like krauts.
If we interpret (1) in a non-metalinguistic manner, B’s denial targets the de-
scriptive content (HansbeingGerman). On theother hand, themereoccurrence
of the slurring term “kraut” suggests that the speaker endorses the germane-
phobic attitude and embraces the practice of classifying and referring to Ger-
mans by using the slurring term.
When it comes to thick terms, intuitions are clearer in the case of thick terms
that usually taken to be objectionable.
(3) Madonna’s show is lewd.
a. Madonna’s show isn’t lewd.
b. Is Madonna’s show lewd?
c. Madonna’s showmight be lewd.
d. If Madonna’s show is lewd, we won’t go.
Projection data like those in (2) and (3) suggest something about where to
locate the evaluative content of pejoratives and evaluatives: all those contexts
(like embedding in the antecedent of a conditional) block entailments; so if the
evaluation survives, it means that the evaluation is not an entailment, it is not
truth-conditional. Brent Kyle (Kyle, 2013), on the other hand, claims that there
is a way to explain these data. For example, if I ask (3-b), I leave it open for the
possibility for Madonna’s show to be lewd. Whereas for a lewd-objector, that
term would be empty, so it would not be employed.
3 Some significant linguistic differences
Let’s now consider some crucial linguistic dissimilarities between pejoratives
and evaluatives.
A. Indirect reports
(4) Pam believes that Madonna’s show is lewd. (But I think it isn’t bad in any
way for being sexually explicit).
(5) Pam believes/said that Hand is a kraut (I think Hans is a fine person).
According to Väyrynen, a speaker of (4) succeeds inmaking it clear that she does
not endorse a negative evaluation of sexual display, whereas a negative attitude
seeps through the operator in (5).
We observe that pejoratives that are not slurs (“asshole”, “damn”, etc) behave
like thick terms in this respect rather than like slurs:
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(6) Pam believes/said that Hans is a [jerk/asshole]. I think he’s a nice guy.
(7) Pam believes/said that the damn Tories are shafting the poor again. (# I
think they’re good guys in politics).
(8) Pam believes/said that that asshole Hans is behind the rumors about her.
(? I think Hans is a good guy).
Slurs and expressives seem to be speaker-oriented (Potts, 2005), in the sense
that their use is taken to indicate that the speaker holds derogatory attitudes,
even in reported speech. On the other hand, other pejoratives and thick terms
are not. Thismight be related to the fact that themeremention of slurs can gen-
erate discomfort, whereas mentioning objectionable thick terms does not.
B. Valence reversal and suspensionWith “Valence reversal” we refer to the fol-
lowing feature of thick terms: thick terms normally associated with a negative
evaluation can be used to convey positive evaluation and vice versa. It is not
quite the same for slurs.
(9) The carnival was a lot of fun. But something was missing. It just wasn’t
lewd. I hope it’ll be lewd next year.
(10) College masters dispense hospitality. But mine is frugal.
(11) ? Yes, he’s certainly a kraut, but that’s what it makes Hans such a good guy.
(12) ? I really like Hans. I just wish he was a kraut.
Moreover, the evaluation typically associated with thick terms can be also
suspended without infelicity. Again, the same does not happen for slurs.
(13) Whether or not it’s a bad thing,Madonna’s show can be truthfully and neu-
trally described as being lewd.
(14) # Whether or not it’s a bad thing, Hans can be truthfully and neutrally de-
scribed as a kraut.
4 What does all this show?
Thedatapresented in2.2. under-determine the theoretical locationof thederog-
ative/evaluative content of slurs and thick terms. But there are enough differ-
ences that it’s not a mark against a theory if it says that the uses of slurs and
thick terms convey derogation/evaluation through different mechanisms of in-
formation transfer.
In anutshell, themainpoints of PekkaVäyrynen’s approach (Väyrynen, 2013)
are the following:
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- The overall set of data presented so far is best explained if these evalua-
tions are implications of utterances involving thick terms which are nor-
mally “not at issue” in their literal uses in normal contexts, andwhich arise
conversationally.
- “Not at issue”: the main point of uttering “Madonna’s show is lewd” is not
to assert the evaluative content. That is backgrounded, while only the de-
scriptive content is asserted (and this suggests a presuppositional appro-
ach).
- The fact that uses of thick terms systematically trigger certain evaluations
does not show that they are systematically or lexically encoded: they are
triggered in virtue of some shared extra-linguistic beliefs/knowledge con-
cerning what sort of evaluative perspective is normally held, and com-
monly known to be held, by a speaker who recognizes a given thick term
as “one of their words”.
5 A newDevelopment
Pragmatic views of thick terms might be seen as special cases of a general prag-
matic mechanism applicable also to slurs. An interesting account in this sense
is the one developed by Bolinger, (2015). Bolinger’s theory is based on the con-
trastive choice principle, and it is based on linguistic work on impoliteness. The
principle thatdoes theexplanatoryworkhas independent support fromresearch
about impoliteness behavior and it sounds like this:
For some content ϕ, when it is common knowledge in the linguistic commu-
nity that:
i. α is an expression for ψ associated with ϕ, and
ii. β is an expression for ψ not associated with ϕ,
Then the situations where the choice of expression is not forced, and the
speaker is aware of (i) and (ii), selecting α in contrast to β signals that the
speaker endorses or shares ϕ.
Applied to slurs, this means that speakers can choose between a slur and its
neutral counterpart and their choice signals the endorsement of the content as-
sociated to the expression.
Going back to thick terms, things are slightly more complicated, as they do
not have a proper counterpart, in the sense that any paraphrase only vaguely
capture the descriptivemeaning. Thismight depend on the fact that thick terms
display muchmore context-sensitivity than slurs; they involve multiple dimen-
sions, for example. Just how those dimensions are established and how they are
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weighed in each context is context-sensitive. Nevertheless, there are some ways
to “relax” the word choice principle: speakers can signal that they do not en-
dorse a certain evaluative content. Since thick terms do not display the same
speaker-orientation of slurs, it should be possible to make it clear whether the
speaker endorses a certain perspective or not.
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